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The advantages of stable exchange rates are widely recognized. The conse-
quences of disorganized and unstable exchanges were amply demonstrated
in the period between the two wars. The merits of an international organiza-
tion to help promote and maintain exchange stability are also admitted. It
could develop trained and able men who would devote their efforts to the
problem of stabilizing the exchanges and to the promotion of international
economic cooperation.
TRANSITION PERIOD
In working out any scheme for stabilization, however, due consideration must
be given to the conditions that will prevail in the immediate postwar period,
i.e., the period of transition from war to more stable economic conditions.
Our first concern is with that transition period.
It is not the purpose here to examine critically the differences between the
two plans or to compare the merits of the one with those of the other. The
general concepts and techniques of the two plans are similar. The important
question is whether any plan of this nature would be workable under the
conditions that will prevail in the postwar period. These plans seem to be
based on the following assumptions: (i) that international payments of the
member countries will be in essential equilibrium, or can be brought into
equilibrium rather quickly with only minor adjustments,8 and (2) that the
adjustments contemplated would be acceptable to the countries involved as
well as to the governing board of the agency. In other words, these plans
seem designed to operate in a stable and orderly world where debit balances
are of a temporary nature and where general economic and political stability
prevail.
No such order and stability will prevail in the transition period. The prob-
lem will be to restore stability in a badly disordered world. Some countries
will have heavy debit balances and others heavy credit balances. Any such
mechanism as that proposed by White or Keynes would be badly bat-
tered by the tidal waves that follow in the wake of war.9 The rates existing
now, and the rates which Mr. White would use in initiating over-all stabil-
ization, are pegged rates and in many cases will turn out to have little re-
8Cf. London Economist, August 28,1943,p. 261.
9 Viner expressed the same viewpoint as follows: "To put cn what is intended to be a
long-run monetary stabilization agency any important responsibilities with respect to the handling
of the emergency problems of the transition period—problems difficult not only technically but
because of their magnitude, their political entanglements, their acutely controversial character,
and the absence in many cases of solid, established governmental authorities to deal with—
would be to put a curse on the agency from the start." ("Two Plans for International Monetary
Stabilization," The Yale Review, Autumn 1943, p. 105.)
22lation to the fundamentals of the various economies in the postwar period.
The same may be said of any rates that might be established in the immediate
postwar period. The real external purchasing power of most currencies is at
present affected by internal exchange restrictions and regulations and, in
many cases, is likely to be substantially lower than the pegged rates now
prevailing.
It has rarely been possible for countries deeply involved in wars to
return quickly to stable exchange rates. Even England, who has always been
jealous of the pound's reputation and exceedingly careful to maintain its
stability, did not attempt to establish definitive rates after the first World
War until 1925,sevenyears after the Armistice. The readjustment of internal
economies and the reestablishment of normal trade relationships often
require years of continuous effort. An attempt to stabilize rates under the
provisions of either plan could prove entirely futile and result in the dissipa-
tion of credits without any lasting accomplishments. Exchange rates cannot
be fixed by agreement and maintained by fiat unless they reflect basic eco-
nomic conditions. The sponsors of the American plan would probably con-
cede that many countries may not be ready immediately after the war to be-
come participating members in the plan, and that it might be years before
some countries would be ready to share fully in the duties and responsibilities
of such membership. Conceding the limitations of the Fund and the difficul-
ties of including all nations initially, however, would strengthen the case for
the key-nation approach, which will be discussed later.
Both plans provide some elasticity in exchange rates, but obviously not
enough to permit major changes without the approval of the directors. A
change of five or ten percent would not be sufficient to meet the shifting con-
ditions and rapid readjustments that will probably characterize the transition
period. Changes 'beyond those narrow limits require approval of the board
of directors, but it might be difficult to get such approval either by majority
vote or by a larger vote.10
One objective of both plans seems to be to void the so-called rigidity of
rates under the gold standard. It may be pointed out, however, that under
the gold standard, nations could and did change rates at times to meet basic
conditions. Itclaimed for these plans that they provide a mechanism for
adjusting rates by agreement, when necessary, so as to prevent unilateral
competitive action. It is debatable, however, whether either of them could
provide sufficient elasticity to meet the requirements of the transition period
and still make any progress toward stability. Furthermore, the question arises
whether some plan for general consultation over proposed rate changes
10Ibid.,p.
23could be worked out without setting up such a mechanism for credits and
controls.
Instability of the exchanges is a symptom or reflection of disorders else-
where, and the problem is to cure those disorders. No country can maintain
a stable currency unless its internal economy is in order—its budget under
control, its price level reasonably stable, and its external payments and re-
ceipts roughly balanced. During the critical transition period efforts will be
made to reestablish orderly political and economic conditions within the
countries most seriously ravaged by war. This is a task primarily of internal
rehabilitation, which will have to be supplemented by external aid in some
form of lend-lease extension and long-term loans for reconstruction purposes.
Even if such a plan did not break down in the transition period, it might
be in such a frozen condition at the end of that period that its effectiveness
would be seriously impaired. If some countries should pile up huge debit
balances while a few others, notably the United States, accumulate huge
credit balances, the Fund (or Union), when faced with the problem of
maintaining exchange stability in a more orderly world after the tran-
sition period, would be greatly handicapped by these huge debit and credit
balances already created. A debtor country would be in the position of hav-
ing exhausted its credit line and having to adopt restrictive measures be-
cause of conditions having nothing to do with its current balance of pay-
ments. Likewise, a creditor country would be in the position of being urged
by the Fund to adopt expansionist measures because of conditions having
nothing to do with its then current balance of payments. In other words, the
abnormal conditions of the transition period could so affect the Fund as to
interfere materially with its usefulness later on.
Even in more normal periods it seems doubtful whether adjustments could
be made within the borrowing limits contemplated in the White plan or
whether such a mechanism could withstand the stresses and strains that
may occur occasionally. Major economic disorders in the world might create
such huge imbalances as to make it almost impossible for a mechan-
ism of that character to operate. Furthermore, the system of multilateral
trading was badly disorganized in the 1930'S, and will probably not be quickly
restored to effective operation. Until the multilateral system is restored, and
a reasonable degree of balance in international payments is achieved, it is
difficult to see how such a plan could operate successfully.11
11 Friedrich A. Lutz of Princeton University, in a careful analysis of the two plans from the
viewpoint of permanent exchange problems, concludes that while they have advantages for the
transition period they do not give a solution which can be regarded as satisfactory for the long
run. He says: "They avoid clear-cut solutions such as the gold standard, or a paper standard, or
one single Central Bank for all countries would offer. Free exchange markets but also foreign
exchange control, fixed exchange rates but also currency depreciation (and in addition perhaps
24Long-term loans that might be resorted to in the transition period would
not necessarily bring about a quick equilibrium in a country's economy or
a permanent balance between external receipts and payments. Such loans, if
wisely made for reconstruction and development purposes, could expedite
essential fundamental adjustments, but they might not correct a lack of
balance in current payments. The experience of the 1920's shows that sub-
stantial credits may be granted without producing the equilibrium necessary
for establishing and maintaining definitive exchange rates. Long-term credits,
therefore, would not be a guarantee that the demands on a stabilization fund
of the kind proposed would be reduced sufficiently to make the Fund work-
able in the transition period.
OBSTACLES TO IMMEDIATE EXCHANGE STABILITY
The obstacles to immediate stabilization of exchange rates for all countries
may be grouped under three heads: political instability, internal economic
instability, international trade dislocations.
Political instability
We do not know what the map of Europe will look like when this war is
over, or when any semblance of political stability will be restored. We do
not know what countries will continue to exist in Europe, what their boun-
daries will be, or in whose sphere of influence they will operate. Internal
strife may break out in some countries. It will take time to create conditions
favorable for exchange stability. The bickerings now going on between fac-
tions of some of the United Nations do not inspire hope of any quick settle-
ment of political problems. Some of the powerful nations may not care to
cooperate in such international organizations as these, or may even frown
upon the participation of the smaller nations living within their sphere of
influence. Until genuine peace and confidence have been restored, it may
be impossible to attain sufficient economic stability to stabilize exchange
rates generally.
internal Economic instability
A second difficulty in the over-all approach is the economic and financial
chaos that will probably prevail in many countries at the end of the war.
a small dose of deflation), the use of gold as international currency but without its having any
role as an integral part of the mechanism of international adjustments; all these ideas are
merged into one plan. It is unlikely that such a combination will work satisfactorily. It seems
more probable that one of the mutually inconsistent ideas worked into the plans will win out.
As it stands, the least desirable, foreign exchange control, would seem to have the best chance."
("International Monetary Mechanisms. The Keynes and White Proposals," Essays in international
Finance, No. i, Princeton University Press, July 1943, p. 2!.)
25Loss of productive facilities and drastically unbalanced budgets leading to
monetary troubles within many countries may make it impossible to fix
rates of exchange with any degree of permanency. It would be very hazard-
ous and costly, for example, to maintain a fixed rate for the French franc
while inflationary influences in that country are unchecked .and before some
degree of economic order is restored. A number of foreign central banks and
private commercial banks will have to be reorganized, their unrealizable
assets written down, and their inflated bank note issues reduced. Some coun-
tries may be able to bring about a quick restoration of internal stability; others
may find it a prolonged and discouraging process.
As a rule, a currency is unstable because of difficult domestic problems,
such as heavy unemployment and a seriously unbalanced budget, which may
be tied up with internal political considerations. For an international body
these internal economic problems would be hard to cure. Loans and credits
might afford temporary relief, but necessary reforms might be postponed.
Much groundwork will need to be done within individual countries by way
of restoring their economies to stable conditions before their proper places
in an international organization can 'be determined. Internal stability is a
prerequisite to enduring external stability.
Trade Restrictions and Dislocations
A third obstacle will be the disorganized and chaotic state of world trade,
and the numerous trade restrictions that exist. It will take time for new
trade relationships to develop and for their effects on the balance of pay-
ments to be felt. What, for example, will happen to the Dutch East Indies
and their markets for rubber, tin, and other products? No doubt the recon-
struction of trade and exchange must be carried on simultaneously, but to
attempt to set up an all-embracing exchange stabilization scheme before some
of these trade problems are reasonably well worked out might lead to so
many maladjustments that the stabilization scheme itself would break down.
Unless there is some stability and equilibrium in trade, it is' almost impossible
•to stabilize exchanges on any sound basis. Equally important is the question
as to what changes will be made in tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions
which hamper the free flow of international trade, and what the effect of
these changes will be.
The lack of balance in trade is often a principal cause of the lack of bal-
ance in international payments, and that obstacle cannot be overcome by
monetary policy alone. A system of multilateral exchanges of goods and ser-
vices that will reflect each country's true economic requirements is essential
to a system of multilateral clearings. The international integration necessary
to promote a reasonable degree of equilibrium in the payments between coun-
26tries will require far-reaching economic cooperation, particularly in the field
of commercial policy. After the dislocations and diverse developments of the
past ten or fifteen years, this integration cannot be accomplished in a short
period of time.12
RELIANCE ON CREDITS
The two plans rely heavily upon credits to solve the world's exchange prob-
lems. It would be possible for many countries to follow the easy course and
borrow as long as credits are available. If the provisions in the plans for ex-
ercising pressure on debtor countries prove to be ineffective, these credits,
instead of accelerating necessary fiscal and economic reforms, might post-
pone them. In fact, the plans are designed to facilitate gradual rather than
abrupt adjustments. The difficulties of many debtor countries might be ob-
scured for a period by stabilization credits, but they might build up econ-
omies that could continue only on the basis of a constant inflow of credits.
When the supply of these credits is exhausted and no long-term loans are
available, the inevitable adjustments might prove to be more painful than
if they had been made in the first place.
After World War I large credits were us.ed to stabilize the continental
exchanges but they broke down because the necessary readjustments were not
made. Some students of that period believe that smaller loans made with
more discrimination and conditioned upon adequate financial and monetary
reforms would have accomplished much more.'3
Bringing all countries immediately into a stabilization agency at the end
of the war might impose upon its credit mechanism insoluble problems from
the outset. Some countries might have to be carried for years without attain-
ing internal political and economic stability. In theory this agency would be
set up to grant short-term credits but in practice many of them might well
turn out to be long-term or permanent credits. As pointed out earlier, the
practical difficulties of separating exchange stabilization credits from relief
and reconstruction loans in the postwar period would be very great. The
freezing of the available credits into long-term loans might cause the system
to bog down unless the creditor countries were willing to continue extending
credits.
The hope is expressed by the sponsors of both plans that other instru-
mentalities would be set up to handle relief and long-term loans for rehabil-
itation and reconstruction, in which case the problem of frozen stabilization
credits might be less serious. As previously pointed out, however, long-term
12 See the discussion of these problems by Folke Hilgerdt, "The Case for Multilateral Trade,"
American Economic Review, Supplement, March 1943, pp. 406-07.
18 Benjamin M. Anderson, "Postwar Stabilization of Foreign Exchange," The Economic Bulletin.
Vol. IV, No. i, May ii, 1943, pp. 18-19.
27credits would be granted for specific purposes and might not remedy a lack
of balance in current payments. At any rate, an adverse balance cannot be
offset indefinitely by long-term credits and a stabilization mechanism of the
kind proposed might not be prevented from breaking down under the im-
pact of continued lack of balance in international payments.
A system of quotas or shares in a credit pooi might encourage debtor
countries to believe that they have a "right" to credits sufficient to balance
their international payments and receipts and that such credits need not be
liquidated. It would raise hopes that could not be fulfilled, and invite abuses
of the credit facilities to the extent that the safeguards provided in the plans
prove inadequate.
Stabilization loans might be more effective in promoting permanent ex-
change stability if granted on the same principles as other credits; that is,
if each individual case is considered on its merits and the granting of the
loan is conditioned upon the carrying out of necessary fiscal and monetary
reforms. Too liberal credits might not be any more effective in the interna-
tional field than in the field of business. Each country has the primary re-
sponsibility for working out its own problems; in order to receive credits,
there should be evidence that it has both the intention and the ability to
bring about the necessary fiscal and monetary reforms and to make other
essential economic adjustments.
A subtle problem of organization arises at this point. Presumably many,
perhaps all, member nations would be borrowers at times and lenders at
times. American banking history suggests the danger of having applications
for loans passed upon by the would-be borrower, or groups of would-be
borrowers who have sometimes been able to vote one another unwarranted
loans. There may be equal danger in going to the opposite extreme and
leaving decisions concerning ioans wholly to creditor interests. How then
shall applications for loans be passed upon in the international organization—
by a full directorate composed of the representatives of both borrowing and
lending nations, or by representatives of the lending nations only, or by the
representatives of all but the applicant nation?
It is practically impossible to determine in .advance how much credit any
particular country may need or under what conditions it should be granted.
The setting up of a uniform system of quotas and credit facilities based upon
the volume of trade, national income, gold holdings, etc., may have no
relationship whatever to the relative credit needs or the creditworthiness of
the various countries. If the credit pooi and the quotas are made large enough
to assure every country what it may need, it offers an opportunity for others
to take advantage of the credits available, whether they are needed or not.
Certain safeguards are provided, of course, and additional safeguards could
28be imposed. But in view of the intricacies of international transactions, it is
not certain whether any safeguards would be effective against a country in-
clined to hide its foreign assets in order to make use of the agency's credits
to the full extent.
INFLATIONARY INFLUENCES
In the immediate postwar period when the world will be combating the in-
flationary influences generated by the war, the Keynes plan might add more
fuel to the fire. The creation of such a huge fund of available credits would
no doubt greatly stimulate the dollar amount of foreign trade as long as
credits are provided, but, if and when they are refused, readjustments could
prove to be very painful. The consequences would be similar to those of
other booms built on inflated credit.
The effect on the United States might be particularly aggravating at a
time when demands will be heavy and goods scarce. The stimulation of
foreign buying in the immediate postwar period would greatly increase the
difficulties of supplying the deferred demands of the public and of holding
prices in check. If the trade boom should collapse about the time the rebuild-
ing of inventories tapers off and the demands for durable goods slacken, it
would accentuate the consequent business recession.14 The postwar infla-
tionary impact of the White plan would be much less than that of the Keynes
plan because of the smaller volume of credits that would be extended.
It is to the interest of the United States, of course, to develop foreign mar-
kets for its products, and this development can be aidedthe granting of
credits. The benefits of a "mushroom" growth stimulated to excessive pro-
portions by short-term credits in the immediate postwar period, however,
might not be lasting. In all likelihood, export trade developed more slowly
and without undue pressure, aided by long-term credits for reconstruction
and development purposes, will have more permanence and stability.
POTENTIAL CREDIT BURDEN ON THEUNITEDSTATES
Unless we decide to retire from international economic affairs, the United
States will have to play the role of the principal world banker after this
'4John H. Williams points out that, "the world may be confronted during the transition from
war to peace with an excess of purchasing power and a deficiency of peacetime goods, so that
for a period, at any rate, a policy of monetary expansion might carry more promise of inflation
than of increased real income and employment." Op. cit., p. 653.
Imre de Vegh says: "A potential further export demand of the proportions made possible by
the Keynes Plan during the reconstruction period means to invite inflation and subsequent dis-
aster." Op. cit., p. 541.
FriedrichA. Lutz points out that the Keynes plan has a permanent inflationary bias because
quotas rise automatically with the aggregate value of international trade. Op. cit., pp. 7-10.,
29war, bothingranting short-term credits and in making long-term loans.
Having made the initial decision, we cannot escape playing this role. The
problem is whether either of the mechanisms proposed would be a suitable
or effective method of extending these credits and carrying out our world
responsibility. It is impossible to tell from either of these plans alone how
deeply we might become involved in the matter of extending credits and
loans. To prevent the stabilization agency from becoming frozen or bogging
down, we might find it necessary, apart from the initial contribution, to ex-
tend more and more credits as time goes on or, if we want to avoid this, to
increase greatly our purchases of goods and services from abroad. The ma-
ch.inery of each plan is set up in such a manner that the creditor countries,
which means chiefly the United States, could extend credits up to very
large amounts and might be called upon to do so in order to prevent opera-
tions from collapsing, unless we decide to keep our external receipts and
payments roughly balanced in other ways.
ECONOMIC CONTROLS
The operation of either plan would involve certain economic controls af-
fecting both international transactions and domestic affairs. Under both
plans a member country renounces the right to alter the gold content of
its currency without the consent of the governing board, with the exceptions
noted above. Under both plans, but more specifically under the Keynes plan,
the money markets of the individual countries will be affected. Further-
more, Keynes suggests that the Clearing Union might become the pivot of
the future economic government of the world and might be used to maintain
stability of prices and to control the trade cycle, if that is desired.
Both plans assume that short-term capital movements would have to be
regulated in the interest of stable exchanges as long as political and eco-
nomic disorders make this necessary. Yet onethe consequences of regulat-
ing short-term capital movements may be increased supervision over all inter-
national transactions. To operate successfully and fairly the agency might be
compelled to require the registration of all gold and foreign exchange hold-
ings and of all international transactions of member countries and their na-
tionals. Even then, its efforts would probably be defeated in a measure by
various devices. The only way to prevent capital exports of a speculative or
political nature is to remove the causes, and this goes back to the problems
of political and economic stability.'5
Under conditions which prevailed in the world prior to 1914,thefree flow
15Forthecontentsof this paragraph I am indebted to Friedrich A. Lutz, who has given an
excellent discussion of the difficulties and implications of trying to control capital movements.
Op. ci:.,pp.17-19.
30of funds, especially short-term funds, from one country to another in re-
sponse to favorable interest rates and investment conditions supplied the
balancing factor in international payments, and there was no necessity for
any over-all control of credits and capital movements. If genuine peace and
stability are restored to the world after this war and responsible governments
are set up in the various countries, the consequent return of international
confidence will doubtless again lead to the free flow of funds from countries
of relative abundance to countries of relative scarcity. Under thos.e condi-
tions an elaborate international organization with broad controls and powers
would be superfluous. In fact there is some question as to whether the set-
ting up of such an organization as that proposed might not actually retard
or impede the free movement of funds according to economic needs. If the
investor is faced with the fact that controls over capital exports may be im-
posed at any time according to fixed international policy, he may be some-
what reluctant to put his funds in a foreign country.
The controls involved in such plans might come into conflict with internal
policies. In recent decades, for example, the United States and other coun-
tries have become acutely conscious of the employment problem.. Employ-
ment, in fact, has become one of our major political problems, and much of
the economic thinking and planning of governments revolves around that
issue. It is doubtful whether member countries will accept outside jurisdiction
over that problem or will make international commitments which might
interfere with the handling of the employment problem at home. It cannot
be assumed that nations will administer internal affairs with the primary
objective of balancing external payments.
The most important practical consideration for any proposal is its adop-
tion by the various governments of the world. Because of the controls neces-
sary for the operation of these plans, a number of countries may hesitate to
accept them, especially in view of doubts about their effectiveness and about
the necessity for setting up agencies with such broad powers and large funds.
Although the experience of the interwar years seems to indicate that some
international cooperation will be necessary to attain stable conditions in post-
war international affairs, it is not clear how far the United States will be
ready to go. The American people have been predominately domestic in their
trade and business activities. International controls of the type suggested
by the Keynes and White plans may appear to many among us needlessly
complicated. A less formalized arrangement might gain initial all-round
approval more easily and perhaps grow as experience is acquired in handling
international matters.
3'